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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, researchers reported robust cross-cultural data that confirmed Darwin's century-old hypothesis of the universality of the expressions of a limited set of basic emotions (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1971) . A few scattered reports in the 1930s and 1940s and a flurry of studies in the decade following the cross-cultural research confirmed Darwin's notion that the universal emotion expressions are innate, not a product of culture-constant learning (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1972; Goodenough, 1932 Goodenough, -1933 Izard, Huebner, Risser, McGinnes, & Dougherty, 1980) . As a function, in part, of these two events, research on emotion expressions has flourished in developmental, personality, and social psychology and in psychophysiology, and it now has a foot in the door of neuroscience (LeDoux, 1987) and clinical psychology (Barlow, 1988; Safran & Greenberg, 1988) .
The success of research on emotion expressions undoubtedly owes much to the development of anatomically based, objective, and precise methods for their measurement (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Izard, 1979) . These microanalytic coding systems make it possible to examine rigorously the relations among expressions, physiological processes, and instrumental behavior (Cohen, Izard, & Simons, 1986; Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983) . For example, the anatomically based systems for coding observable facial behavior facilitated the study of covert expressions This work was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant BNS8706146 and National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH4205002A.
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Carroll E. Izard, Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716. by electromyography (EMG). The facial behavior coding systems specified the muscles involved in each appearance change or expressive behavior in each region of the face. Thus, the investigator can place electrodes on muscles predicted to be involved in the expression of particular emotions. Studies of covert expression have shown reliable relations between patterns of EMG activity associated with specific emotions and corresponding emotion experiences or feeling states measured by self-report (Fridlund, Schwartz, & Fowler, 1984; Rusalova, Izard, & Simonov, 1975; Schwartz, Fair, Salt, Mandel, & KJerman, 1976 ). Other EMG studies have shown consistent relations among expressive behavior, physiological functioning, and self-reported emotion experience.
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Despite the volume of research on emotion expressions, including studies showing consistent expression-experience relations, the precise role of expressive behavior in emotion experience remains controversial. Tomkins (1962) argued that naturally occurring emotion expression determines emotion experience. Buck (1985) stated that expression is merely a readout of underlying experience and plays no causal role in internal states. Fridlund (in press) maintained that expressive behavior is best conceived as serving a social-communicative function, with no necessary, direct relation between an expression and a corresponding experience. I have argued that emotion expression may be described by any of the foregoing positions, depending on the individual's stage of development and his or her style and skills for emotion regulation (Izard, 1977; Izard & Malatesta, 1987) .
The possibility that emotion expression plays a role in the regulation of emotion experience makes the relation of expression and experience of practical as well as theoretical importance. If emotion expression is only a readout of emotion experience, it would play no part in the regulation of feeling states. If expressive behavior causes or contributes to the activation of emotion feelings, then the regulation of emotion expression through socialization, self-management, or therapeutic guidance could result in regulation or a contribution to the regulation of emotion experience.
The role of facial expression in activating and regulating emotion experience has become a lively topic of research and theoretical discussion. There is already a substantial body of literature, and it is increasing steadily. The hypothesis tested in these studies has been labeled the "facial feedback hypothesis" (FFH). Some investigators have explained findings that confirm the hypothesis as direct effects of sensory feedback from receptors in the facial muscles and skin (e.g., Lanzetta, CartwrightSmith, & KJeck, 1976) . Laird (1984) , however, explained the results of his experiments as a function of self-perception. In his view, the effects of experimenter-manipulated facial movements are a function of the subject's perception of her or his expressive behavior. In this case, the role of sensory feedback is not clearly specified, though presumably it figures in the process of selfperception. Leventhal (1984) attributed the primary role in emotion activation to a central motor mechanism, but he ascribed a role to expressive-behavior feedback in that he sees it as making a contribution to the guidance of central activity. Finally, Zajonc and his colleagues (1985; Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989) have presented evidence indicating that expressive behavior exerts its influence on affective experiences by regulating venal blood flow in the brain. Although theoretically interesting, the choice among these interpretations may not be critical to the larger issue of expression-experience relations. In all four models, expressive behavior plays a role in activating and regulating emotion experience. They differ in that each assumes a different mechanism through which expression exerts its influence.
Origins of Facial Feedback Hypothesis
The idea of using expressive behavior to activate or regulate the emotion required by the situation may be as old as recorded history. Believers in the efficacy of expressive behavior might even find support in Homer's Iliad. The soldiers sieging Troy are told to go forth to battle with a high heart, and the goddess Athena frequently went among Agamemnon's troops, pumping them up for battle. And in Shakespeare's Henry V, the king's effort to pump up his soldiers contains a vivid description of the expressive behavior of anger.
Then imitate the action of the tiger: Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood, Disguise fair nature with hard-favored rage; Then lend the eye a terrible aspect: Let it pry through the portage of the head Like the brass cannon; let the brow o'erwhelm it As fearfully as doth a galled rock O'erhang and jutty his confounded base, Swilled with the wild and wasteful ocean. Now set the teeth and stretch the nostril wide.
Hold hard the breath and bend up every spirit To his full height! -Act iii, Scene i
Henry's eloquent charge to his soldiers is similar in intent to a coach's final challenge to his team before entering the competition. Coaches say that given roughly equal athletic ability and skills, the team that stays pumped up emotionally wins. It is probably no accident that the "pump-up" posture of coiled body and thrusting, clenched fists is the trademark of Jimmy Connors, who has won more singles titles than any tennis player in the history of the game.
An equally common use of expression manipulation occurs in contemporary theater, as actors in the Stanislavski tradition attempt to feel precisely as would the character. An early example of this was also described by Shakespeare. This passage, in which the word conceit can be read as imagination, occurs when Hamlet marvels, perhaps with irony, at an actor's ability to force his soul so to his own conceit That from her working all his visage wann'd, Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect, A broken voice, and his whole function suiting With forms to his conceit.. . .
-Hamlet, Act ii, Scene ii
Classic Formulations of FFH
The classical, poetic observations on the form and functions of expressive behavior can be interpreted as consistent with the ideas of Darwin and James, who inspired some emotion theorists to incorporate the feedback notion in their conception of the emotion process (Izard, 1971; Tomkins, 1962) . As is so often the case in the scientific study of emotions, a historical perspective on the issues must begin with Charles Darwin, the first scientist to hint at a role for facial expressions in the activation of emotion feelings or emotion experience. "Even the simulation of an emotion tends to arouse it in our minds" (Darwin, 1872 (Darwin, /1965 . This can be viewed as an explicit statement of the facial feedback principle in emotion activation, but Darwin was not entirely consistent on this point. Sometimes he described expressions as following from "a state of mind" or intention. He was more specific and consistent in describing a role for expressive behavior in the control or regulation of emotion feelings.
The free expression by outward signs of an emotion intensifies it. On the other hand, the repression, as far as this is possible, of all outward signs softens our emotions. He who gives way to violent gestures will increase his rage; he who does not control the signs of fear will experience fear in a greater degree, (p. 365) Eighteen years after the publication of Darwin's work on emotion, William James stated a principle of emotion regulation virtually identical to Darwin's. "Refuse to express a passion and it dies. . . . If we wish to conquer undesirable emotional tendencies in ourselves, we must assiduously, and in the first instance, go through the outward movements of those contrary dispositions which we prefer to cultivate" (James, 1890 (James, / 1950 . In this passage and elsewhere, James, unlike Lange (1885 Lange ( /1922 , clearly implicates the voluntary, striated musculature in emotion dynamics. He adds to Darwin's idea the notion of control of one (undesired) emotion through the expression of another (more acceptable one).
Two other scholars contributed to the early literature linking voluntary, striated muscle activity to emotion experience. F. H. Allport (1924) proposed that sensory feedback from voluntary (somatic) muscles distinguished one emotion from another.
We propose that the differentiating factor arises from the stimulation of the proprioceptors in the muscles, tendons, and joints of the somatic part of the organism; and that afferent impulses from these somatic patterns of response add to the autonomic core of affectivity the characteristic sensory complexes by which one emotion is distinguished from another of the same affective class. {Allport, 1924, pp. 91-92) In this formulation, Allport went beyond James and differed from the James-Lange theory in specifying and emphasizing patterns of sensory feedback from somatic activity as playing the key role in differentiating discrete emotion experiences.
Edmund Jacobson (1929) observed that neuromuscular activity increases in emotion and reasoned that relaxation of striated musculature of the face and body was indispensable in the control of emotion. Jacobson's idea inspired some of the techniques developed by behavior therapists who were not concerned with expressive behaviors associated with discrete emotions. Gellhorn (1958) replicated some of Jacobson's work with laboratory animals. He used curare to completely relax the musculature and then showed that drug-induced muscle relaxation led to a decrease in sympathetic nervous system and hypothalamic responsiveness. He thus provided a neurophysiological rationale for the therapeutic effects of neuromuscular relaxation on emotional tension. It appears that self-regulated skeletal muscle activity congruent with emotion-specific facial expression would produce stronger expression effects than either alone. Adding congruent cognition to this combination of expressive behaviors would appear to provide a potent procedure for activating and regulating emotions. Tomkins (1962) denned emotion as facial response and awareness of the facial response as tantamount to awareness of the emotion. He believes that receptors in the skin of the face are the primary source of the sensory information involved in the activation of emotion experiences (Tomkins, 1979) . Gellhorn (1964) was the first theorist to describe a detailed neurophysiological basis for the role of striated muscle activity in emotion and to provide biologically based arguments for the deliberate use of expressive behavior in the activation and control of the emotions. He concluded: "The educational and therapeutic value of the control of expressive movements. . .liesin the fact that they may be used to trigger or inhibit the emotions" (1964, p. 467) . "Or, to express it differently,. . .emotions can be controlled by willed action of the skeletal musculature" (1970, p. 59, italics added) . Following Gellhorn's (1964 Gellhorn's ( , 1970 suggestion that skeletal musculature could provide a mechanism for the regulation of emotions, Izard(1971,chap, ^de- scribed therapy techniques based on this principle and differential emotions theory.
FFH in Contemporary Emotion Theory

Summary of Early Ideas on Expression-Feeling Relations
Three distinct though related ideas are imbedded in the early statements about the role of expressive behavior in emotion experience. These ideas are based on the explicit or implicit assumption of a direct connection between emotion expressions and emotion feelings. The first idea following from this assumption is that naturally occurring emotion feelings, those that result from emotion-eliciting events or conditions, can be influenced by self-managed expressive behavior. The origin of this idea is uncertain and may be at least as old as written records. The second idea, less often explicitly enunciated, is that selfinitiated ("willed") expressive behavior can activate emotion feelings. This is also an ancient idea, but it first appeared in scientific writing in the works of Darwin (1872 Darwin ( /1965 and James (1890 James ( /1950 . Third, the explicit hypothesis that naturally occurring (or spontaneous) discrete facial expressions are sufficient causes of corresponding discrete emotion feelings seems to have originated with Tomkins (1962) , although rudiments of the idea were described by Shakespeare, Darwin, James, and others.
Laird's Facial Feedback Hypothesis Laird (1974) proposed the hypothesis that a subject-blind, experimenter-manipulated facial expression would elicit a corresponding emotion experience. Although this hypothesis has been attributed to Darwin, James, Tomkins, Gellhorn, and Izard, it is clearly distinct from their ideas of regulating naturally occurring feelings by self-management of expressive behavior or activating feelings through goal-directed, self-initiated expressions. Explanation of the effect of such self-initiated actions and those of experimenter-manipulated facial movements may require different concepts and the assumption of different mechanisms. That investigators have confused Laird's hypothesis relating to subject-blind, experimenter-manipulated expressions and self-managed or self-initiated expressions has contributed to the FFH controversy. Because the research relevant to this controversy has been reviewed several times, I will present only a brief synopsis to set the stage for a reconceptualization of this research.
Three recent reviews of the approximately 20 studies relating to FFH reached divergent conclusions. Laird (1984) concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly favors FFH, supporting the notion that experimenter-manipulated facial expressions affect emotion experience. Winton (1986) reviewed the same studies and demonstrated that Laird's conclusion applies only to a weak or dimensional form of FFH. Most of the favorable evidence comes from studies that manipulated one positive and one negative facial expression, showing only that the facial-expression manipulation changes emotion experience on a positive-negative or hedonic dimension. According to Winton, Laird's conclusion that manipulated expressions of joy and anger lead to the experience of joy and anger, respectively, is unwarranted.
Winton argued that the strong or categorical form of FFH (e.g., manipulated joy expression leads to joy experience and anger expression leads to anger experience) requires that the experimenter contrast the effects of at least two positive or two negative emotions and use a dependent measure that can adequately distinguish between the experiences of these emotions. The only published study that meets these criteria (Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979) failed to support the categorical version of FFH. Contrary to most of the evidence, it also failed to support the dimensional version of FFH. A series of unpublished studies (described in Izard, 1977, Chaps. 3 & 4) that met Winton's criteria also failed to support the categorical version. Matsumoto (1987) used meta-analytic techniques to determine the mean effect size for experimenter-manipulated facial expression. For 16 studies (reported in 11 articles) that used self-report measures of emotion experience as a dependent variable, the mean effect size (in Pearson r) was .343, indicating that only 11.8% of the total variance in emotion experience can be attributed to the experimenter-manipulated facial expression. This value is probably inflated, as Matsumoto noted, because negative results are rarely published. Although Matsumoto did not distinguish between studies testing different versions of FFH, all the studies used in his meta-analysis, except the one by Tourangeau and Ellsworth, tested the dimensional version.
Recently, in a series of five related studies, Zajonc et al. (1989) have amassed a body of data that provide indirect support for the dimensional version of the FFH. They showed that facial movements similar to, though not identical with, those that signal emotions were capable of altering affective preferences and feelings indexed on a dimension of pleasantness-unpleasantness. Considered as a set, the experimental designs of Zajonc et al. surmounted many of the problems that have plagued the FFH studies. In particular, by using expression-analogous movements (e.g., that associated with vocalizing the German phoneme it) rather than expression-specific movements, they avoided the most serious criticism of FFH studies-that expression-specific movements enable subjects to make inferences about emotion experiences.
The ultimate purpose of the foregoing Zajonc et al. studies was to support the hypothesis that the effects of facial-muscle movements on affective experiences are mediated by changes in vascular blood flow to the brain, which in turn mediate changes in hormones and neurotransmitters. Their data were consistent with the "vascular theory of emotional efference": Facial movements that increased cerebral temperature through changes in vascular blood flow triggered unpleasant feelings, whereas those that decreased brain temperature activated pleasant feelings. They succeeded in showing that air-induced changes in indirect measures of cerebral temperature (unrelated to facial muscle movements) resulted in the predicted changes in feelings. Of particular interest here, they concluded that their data showed that facial movements alone, without cognitive mediation, elicited or altered feeling states and that emotion-specific movements should have emotion-specific effects. The conclusion of Zajonc et al. is consistent with the position that feedback from externally manipulated facial expressions can influence emotion feelings (e.g., Laird, 1984; Lanzetta et al. 1976 ).
Reconceptualization of Facial Feedback Research
Most of the previous experiments on the facial feedback hypothesis fall into two general classes, those that employ experimenter-manipulated expressions and those that use spontaneous, self-initiated, and self-managed expressions. Such self-regulated expression is behavior that the subject is motivated to perform in pursuit of a desired goal. Thus, self-initiated expression is an integral part of goal-directed behavior.
The goal of self-initiated expressive behavior may be deliberately chosen with the expectation that it will help in meeting the demands of a given situation. An example is the decision to express interest when listening to anger-eliciting criticisms from someone in a position to thwart a highly desirable plan. In this case, the goal is represented symbolically and can be cognitively adjusted. An individual may be conscious of the goal but unable to articulate it. An example is the toddler who exaggerates her distress or sadness expression to elicit greater sympathy and nurturance. On the other hand, the goal may be embedded in unconscious cognitive processes if the goal-directed thoughts and actions have become automatized through experience (Kihlstrom, 1987) . A mother may automatically smile for her children even when she is sick or worried. Here, the intention, like the goal, may be unconscious. The mother's actions are deliberate and purposeful though not necessarily conscious in all details.
The goal may be completely self-determined or may be adopted at the suggestion or request of someone else (e.g., experimenter, parent, or therapist). The critical requirement is that the person, explicitly or implicitly, accepts the goal as his or her own and as desirable or worthwhile. This ensures that the expressive behaviors are goal-directed and self-involving behaviors. Six of the studies surveyed by Laird, Winton, and Matsumoto employed self-regulated, goal-directed expressive behavior (Kleinke & Walton. 1982; Kopel & Arkowitz, 1974; Kraut, 1982; Lanzetta et al., 1976, 2 studies; Zuckerman, Klorman, Larrance, & Spiegel, 1981) .
A reanalysis of Matsumoto's meta-analytical data revealed that the mean effect size (in Pearson r) for the six studies in his survey employing self-regulated expression was .457, whereas that for the 10 studies using experimenter-manipulated expression was .275. Although none of these six studies of self-managed expressions tested the categorical version of the FFH, they did show significant expression-mediated changes in positive or negative emotion experience.
Several relevant studies were not covered in the recent reviews of the research on the FFH. Two of these (McCanne & Anderson, 1987; Rutledge & Hupka, 1985) used procedures that involved both experimenter-manipulated and self-managed expressions. Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) used a subtle, "nonobtrusive" experimenter manipulation that inhibited or facilitated the target expression (smiling) by mechanical means (e.g., holding a pen with the lips or with the teeth). According to the authors, their task of holding a pen with the teeth "allowed a smile to occur," and hence their finding of greater amusement in response to cartoons could be attributed to spontaneous smiling. Rusalova et al. (1975) used procedures involving self-managed, imagery-induced expressive behaviors and measured changes in heart rate and facial electromyography (EMG). All of these studies reported positive results, and effects attributable to spontaneous or self-managed expressions were generally greater than those in experimenter-manipulated expressions. Finally, several studies of Leventhal and his col-leagues generally support the notion that feedback from selfmanaged expressive behavior influences the subjective experience of pain and emotion (Cupchik & Leventhal, 1974; Leventhal& Mace, 1970) .
The Rusalova et al. study illustrates several aspects of the technique of self-managed expressions. Also, it is one of several studies that demonstrates the close relation between specific emotion feelings and a corresponding emotion-specific pattern of facial muscle (EMG) activity. They had professional Soviet actors, trained in the method of Stanislavski, imagine scenes to elicit joy, fear, anger, and sadness. In the first condition for each emotion, subjects were told to feel the emotion and express it freely. In the second condition, they were told to feel the emotion but suppress the expression. In the third condition, they were told to express the emotion without feeling it. These conditions produced highly significant differences in EMG patterns and heart rate. For the professional actors, the pattern of EMG activity was emotion specific for all four emotions, confirming and extending the earlier work of Schwartz et al. (1976; cf. Dimberg, 1986) . For all subjects EMG activity and average heart rate were highest in the spontaneous conditions (feel the emotion and express it), intermediate in the suppress-expression condition (feel the emotion but not express it), and lowest in the condition where the subjects expressed the emotion and suppressed the feeling. That the effects of the suppress-expression condition were in the intermediate position may be due to the subjects' inability to completely suppress expressive behavior while imagining an emotional scene. The EMG records showed that expressive behavior occurred in this condition. However, the results are consistent with the present reconceptualization of the facial feedback research in showing the relative weakness of compliant expressive behavior that is not intended to alter feelings (third condition). Although the experimenters did not systematically measure subjective experiences, the actors, as would be expected from their training, imagined or recalled vivid and evocative scenes (e.g., funeral of a loved one or a horse being brutally beaten) and reported strong emotion feelings in the first and second conditions. It was not uncommon to hear quiet chuckles during joy imagery and to see tears during sadness imagery.
Reasons for Weak Effect of External Manipulation
Why does external manipulation of facial expression produce only a weak effect? There are several plausible possibilities.
First, the innervation of voluntary and involuntary facial expressions involves different neural pathways (Monrad-Krohn, 1924; Noback & Demarest, 1975) . Sensory feedback from the two kinds of expression may be processed differently and contribute to conscious experience in different ways. The central processing of involuntarily produced sensory feedback is automatic, as is any subsequent effect on emotion experience. Because voluntary expression is learned, any connection between voluntarily produced facial feedback and emotion experience may depend on the interaction of the feedback with various contextual and cognitive factors. Congruence or incongruence between a set of these factors and an expression may inhibit or facilitate the activation or regulation of emotion experience.
It is widely acknowledged that a particular emotion expression can be simulated even when the expressor is experiencing a contrary emotion feeling (Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Izard, 1977, chap. 4) . People smile to cover sadness and feign anger to counter their fear. Some of these connections may become strong, habitual, even automatic-like associations (e.g., the smile that accompanies the daily greeting to a superior), and such expressions may have little or no effect on emotion experiences. Other voluntary expression-feeling connections may be largely situationally determined. Surely the links between voluntary expressions and internal states are multiply determined, serve numerous functions in social interactions, and vary across individuals and cultures. All these factors could impede the effects of voluntary expressions, especially when the expressions are simply movements complying with an experimenter's requests. Laird (1984) now maintains that experimenter-manipulated expression effects can be demonstrated only in subjects who are specially sensitive to internal cues.
Second, in terms of the present reconceptualization, as well as other formulations (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Tomkins, 1962) , connections between voluntary expressions and emotion feelings are subject to learning and self-regulation. Learned regulatory processes, some of which may be unconscious and automatic, could interfere with the effects of external manipulation.
Third, considering the foregoing characteristics of expressive behavior, it is reasonable to assume that there are many learned connections or associations between voluntarily produced expressions and emotion experiences. Many of these learned connections are in the service of emotion regulation via dissimulation, and in these circumstances the expression is incongruent with the ongoing subjective feeling. A self-initiated incongruent expression has the desired effect. For example, one may learn to smile in the face of threat and attenuate fear by changing the usual feedback pattern in such situations (cf. Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986) . Indeed, this is essentially what Darwin and James proposed, although their proposal was more like friendly tuition than formal theory. However, expression-feeling incongruence would work against the purpose of an externally manipulated expression. An experimenter-manipulated expression may be initially incongruent with the subject's ongoing feelings, thereby weakening the overall effect of the particular expression manipulation on the target emotion experience.
Finally, the experimenter-manipulated facial expression effect may be weak and nonspecific because the procedure impresses subjects as an irrational and intrusive demand, and they respond emotionally to their own attributions. Such a response may help account for the lack of an emotion-specific response to the facial movements. This cognitively mediated effect probably varies with the credulity of the subjects and the credibility of the experimenter.
In summary, there are several factors that might interfere or interact with the effect of experimenter-manipulated expressions. Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence indicates that experimenter-manipulated expressions do have statistically significant effects on positive and negative emotion experiences.
A Developmental Model of Expression-Feeling Relations
A recent theory of emotional development had as one of its chief concerns developmental changes in relations among the neural, expressive, and experiential components of emotion (Izard & Malatesta, 1987 ). The present model of expressionfeeling relations is an extension of that theory.
Assumptions Underlying the Model
The model is based on five principles or assumptions. First, in early development, an internal or external emotion-eliciting event triggers the neural processes of affective evaluation that lead directly to an expression and a congruent experience or feeling state-the principle of innate expression-feeling concordance. Second, innate connections among the evaluative, expressive, and experiential components ensure that the three components operate in infancy in a unidirectional loop (evaluation, expression, and feeling), wherein feeling state can provide feedback on and influence, even modulate, subsequent expression and feeling-the principle of interactive emotion components. Third, the maturation of neural inhibitory mechanisms and cognitive capacities enables reciprocal or multidirectional processes in the connections among emotion components. In particular, they enable the individual to learn techniques of influencing the processes that underlie emotion evaluation, expression, and experience-the principle of learned emotion regulation.
Fourth, self-initiated, intentional expressive behavior increases the synchrony and congruence among the emotions system, cognition, and action. Thus, it increases the likelihood that sensory feedback from expressive behavior will be processed without interruption from competing-contrary signals (cf. Cacioppo et al., 1986 )-the principle of synchrony among systems.
Finally, the capacity for self-initiated or self-modulated expressive behavior emerges at about 1 year of age and increases rapidly after the acquisition of language and the cognitive skills for articulating goals. Genetically based temperament-personality traits, cognitive development, and experience contribute to the growth of skills and techniques in managing expressive behavior to regulate emotions and social interaction. This principle asserts that developmental processes are critical in the elaboration and control of expression-feeling relations.
Innate expressive capacities: The most controversial of the foregoing propositions is innate expression-feeling concordance (cf. Kagan, 1984; Lewis & Michalson, 1983) . However, the evidence suggests that expression-feeling concordance is biologically feasible at birth. The work reviewed by Jacobs and Nadel (1985) and Izard and Malatesta (1987) suggests that young infants do have emotion experiences, and the work of several investigators indicates that the neuromuscular substrates of emotion expression are in place at birth. The neuromuscular units necessary for emotion expressions are present by the 28th week of gestation (Oster & Ekman, 1978) . The highly differentiated pattern of efferent and afferent pathways associated with facial expression is a neurophysiological mechanism that has the required specificity to activate emotion-specific feelings(cf. Bandler, 1982; Flynn, 1967) . Facial skin is particularly well supplied with receptors highly sensitive to the minute stretching or wrinkling resulting from even very subtle expressive movements (Johansson, Trulsson, Olsson, & Westberg, 1988; Nordin, Hagbarth, Thomandu, & Wallin, 1984) .
Capability of facial feedback system. The chief arguments against innate expression-feeling concordance and the role of sensory feedback in emotion-feeling differentiation are not convincing. First, Cannon's (1927) attack on the James-Lange theory was concerned with visceral feedback and has no bearing on the facial feedback hypothesis (see Izard, 1977, pp. 55-64 , for a review). Second, Rinn's (1984) argument that there may be insufficient proprioceptors in the face for discrete patterned feedback does not negate the evidence that the low threshold mechanoreceptive (LTM) neurons that project to the face are adequate to the task (Dubner, Sessle, & Storey, 1978) . Using the method of microneurography, Johansson, Trulsson, Olsson, and Abbs (1988) showed that the mechanoreceptors in facial skin respond vigorously to facial muscle movement. Because all the expressive muscles insert directly into facial skin, cutaneous mechanoreceptors are sensitive to the slightest movement. Johansson et al. concluded that their findings are consistent with the idea that cutaneous mechanoreceptors transduce data that stem directly from stretching-deformation of the skin (and indirectly from muscle contraction) to provide proprioceptive information on facial movement. Additionally, a substantial percentage of facial LTM neurons have visceral afferent convergence (Hu, Dostrovsky, & Sessle, 1981) , and this is consistent with the notion that somatic feedback from the face plays a role in recruiting visceral activity (Izard, 1977) . The data of Hu et al. clearly revealed an anatomical basis for the coordination of facial and visceral afferent input to thalamus and hence to cortex. Third, at the behavioral level, several experiments that examined the role of facial feedback from self-initiated or selfmanaged expression in emotion activation or emotion regulation have yielded moderately robust affirmative evidence. These studies will be assessed in a later section.
Although facial feedback is considered an important factor in emotion activation in infancy, other mechanisms of emotion activation and emotion regulation emerge with maturation and learning. These processes and the role of the autonomic nervous system activity in amplifying and sustaining emotion are discussed elsewhere (Izard, 1977; cf. Fehr & Stern, 1970) and in a later section of this article.
The Model, the FFH, and the Effective Use of Involuntary and Voluntary Expressions
According to the present model, expression-feeling relations change with maturation and cognitive development. The several systems involved in adult expression-feeling relations, such as those involved in FFH studies, require maturation and experience to become functional.
Developmental prerequisites. The facial expressions of pain and the emotions of interest, enjoyment, surprise, sadness, anger, disgust, and fear are present at birth or by about 7 months of age (Izard el al., 1980) . In early infancy, these expressions are best described as reflex like. Evocative stimuli elicit these expressions through automatic, unconscious processes. There is no evidence that the infant's initial expression to an eliciting stimulus is modulated in any way (Izard & Malatesta, 1987) . Such modulation awaits both neural and cognitive development. For example, evidence suggests that the neural mechanisms that enable the inhibition of the pain expression do not begin to become functional until after about 7 months of age, after which the duration of the pain expression following diptheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT) inoculation decreases and that of the anger expression increases (Izard, Hembree, Dougherty, & Spizzirri, 1983) . Even at 19 months of age, neural maturation and socialization have not enabled all individuals to inhibit the all-out emergency pain expression.
The cognitive capacities required for the regulation of the initial expression to an eliciting stimulus are absent or nonfunctional in early infancy. According to Jacobs and Nadel (1985) , the capacity to associate emotion experience with contextual information is also absent in infancy. To modulate an emotion expression through cognitive processes, the infant has to comprehend the meaning and anticipate the effects of the eliciting event. In the studies of emotion responses to the DPT inoculation, there was no evidence that infants 2 to 19 months of age with normal medical histories had any comprehension of the significance of the syringe or anticipation of the acute pain that would follow injection of the serum (Izard et al., 1983; Izard, Hembree, & Huebner, 1987) . It seems that inhibition or regulation of the rapid, automatic pain expression would require that control processes be initiated before the pain is sensed. The same should hold for the regulation of the basic emotion expressions in response to effective stimuli.
With learning and experience, people can slow down or even inhibit overt expression. This delay between the evaluation of the eliciting event and the onset of the expressive behavior becomes a doorway for regulatory processes. Perceptual and cognitive processes, which take time, can operate in this gap and hence influence subsequent emotion expression and emotion experience. It is conceivable that people can eventually learn to create a delay between spontaneous expression and experience. This would create another mechanism for altering expressionexperience connections and relations, but it might be unreliable and difficult to establish, especially under stressful conditions.
As already noted, the movements of emotion expressions are innervated by the somatic nervous system (Gellhorn, 1964; Jacobson, 1929) and thus involve neuromuscular mechanisms that, through development, become subject to voluntary control. Therefore, the most direct and efficient route to modifications in the connections between the component emotion processes that contribute to the regulation of emotion experiences is through learned control of expressive behavior. Such learning is a part of everyone's growing up. Emotion expressions are readily observable by parents, as well as by teachers, therapists, and peers, and all of these observers can influence the socialization or modifications of expression-experience relations. Long before people reach young adulthood, the age of subjects in the experiments on facial feedback, the many techniques they have learned for regulating the relations between emotion expressions and emotion feelings include exaggeration, minimization, and inhibition of expressions and the dissociation of expression and experience. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that there are some constraints on how far they can go in harnessing expressions for the purpose of initiating or regulating emotion feelings. Among these constraints are individual differences in emotion thresholds and intensities, early experience, and familial and cultural attitudes and rules (Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1971) .
Emotion regulation through management of involuntary expressions. The neural substrates and interconnections of involuntary or spontaneous facial expressions suggest that they are a more efficient and direct mechanism for regulating emotion experience than are voluntary expressions. Involuntary expressions are encoded in the genome and probably have innate connections to the neural substrates of emotion experiences. Voluntary expressions are learned behaviors controlled by neural pathways that are different from the preprogrammed and interconnected systems that mediate involuntary emotion expressions and feelings (DeMeyer, 1980; Monrad-Krohn, 1924 . Limbic and extrapyramidal circuits are relatively more involved in involuntary expression, whereas motor cortex and the pyramidal tract are relatively more involved in voluntary expression. Bard (1928) showed that only the brain stem and posterior hypothalamus were necessary for the display of a complete pattern of involuntary rage responses in cats, and Steiner (1979) found that involuntary disgust and other orofacial expressions in human neonates are mediated by the brain stem, a structure incapable of mediating voluntary expressions.
There are interconnections between the subcortical structures that mediate involuntary expressive behavior, those that evaluate stimuli for affective significance, and those that control autonomic responses associated with emotions (LeDoux, 1987; Smith & E>eVito, 1984) . These affective evaluative processes play a role in activating emotions (LeDoux, 1987) , and autonomic activity may play a role in modulating the intensity of emotion experiences (Chwalisz, Deiner, & Gallagher, 1988) . Thus, intentional regulation of involuntary expressions could directly affect the neural circuitry involved in naturally occurring emotions. This is consistent with the notion that voluntary expressions will be more likely to have an effect if they conform to the pattern of movements in involuntary expressions.
Only the involuntary expression system can be assumed to be operative in early infancy. The infant is not capable of simple reaching and grasping until about 4 months of age (Gesell & Ilg, 1943) . Considerable maturation is required before the motor areas of the neocortex are capable of coordinating fine motor movements. It is not until about the end of the first year of life that infants' behavior suggests that they are capable of coordinating the higher-order cognitive processes and more complex motor components involved in voluntarily displaying or altering a configuration of several facial muscle movements. Therefore, in order for voluntary expressions to become an effective mechanism for activating emotion experience, there must be a period for the maturation of neural mechanisms that mediate voluntary movements of the superficial musculature of the face, and the connections between voluntary expressions and congruent feelings must be learned by associating appropriate expressive, affective, and cognitive processes.
In contrast, the relatively easier process of modulating emotion experiences by self-regulating naturally occurring expressions requires only the maturation of neural inhibitory mechanisms and the cognitive capacity necessary for intentional behavior. Both of these types of mechanisms are apparently operative by the end of the first year of life (Golinkoff, 1983; Izard etal., 1987) .
No model, including the present one, can explain precisely how expressive behavior or any other mechanism generates emotion experience. This would be equivalent to explaining consciousness, or how neurochemical and motor processes achieve awareness. The present model assumes that the body of evidence reviewed shows that facial expressions, through one of several possible mechanisms, can elicit and modulate emotion experiences, and it describes developmental processes that help explain the results of facial feedback research.
Conditions required for effective use of voluntary expressions. The model assumes that in early development an innately programmed expression triggers a corresponding emotion experience. The expression effect may be mediated by a central motor mechanism {cf. Leventhal, 1984; Tomkins, 1962) , but, consistent with LeDoux's (1987) concept of a subcortical emotion activation system, the central program need not involve neocortex. At any point in later development, the spontaneous or involuntary encoding of an innate expressive pattern activates the expression-specific experience or feeling state.
For voluntary expressive movements to activate feeling, the pattern must simulate the innate configuration or one of its components. Any major component of the pattern may be sufficient, if the other regions of the face are not encoding signals relating to other emotions. The timing of the expression should approximate that of spontaneous expressions, but some leeway is possible (cf. Ekman et al., 1983) . It is conceivable that a nonemotion-expressive movement could be associated with a particular feeling through learning and later become effective in controlling emotion experience through voluntary expressive behavior. Dimberg's (1986) work suggests that this would be difficult to accomplish.
Effective use of voluntary expressions in emotion regulation also requires that they be goal-directed, self-initiated, and selfregulated. Finally, cognitive processes should be congruent with the goal of the voluntary expressive behavior. Although these specifications should provide enough structure for beginning experimental and clinical investigation, optimal parameters for using goal-directed, self-managed expressive behavior in research and therapy will have to be worked out empirically.
The model and expressive-behavior techniques in therapy. There is no body of systematic research that bears directly on the hypothesis that the regulation of emotions through facial expressions can be used effectively in therapy. Various therapies make some use of catharsis, emphasizing the expression of feeling both verbally and nonverbally, but they give no special attention to facial expressions. Nichols (1974) found that in "feelingexpressive therapy" high expressors ("dischargers") improved more than low expressors, suggesting that expressive therapy may be more beneficial for some people than for others. In a study of long-term feeling-expressive therapy, Pierce, Nichols, and DuBrin (1983) reaffirmed the earlier finding that, in general, improvement was a function of the degree of client expressiveness. Again, expressiveness was more helpful in some cases than in others, but the evidence did not provide a strong explanation for the difference. As Greenberg and Safran (1987) noted, these studies have methodological weaknesses (lack of control groups or heterogeneity of samples), but the investigators may be correct in suggesting, as does the present model, that a more differentiated view of emotion should improve the approach. This version of feeling-expressive therapy did not consider the information now available on emotion-specific expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Izard, 1979) and the dynamic relations that exist among discrete emotion feeling states (Izard, 1972 (Izard, , 1977 Tomkins, 1962 Tomkins, , 1963 .
Perhaps the most extensive body of research on therapy that involves a form of somatic manipulations or expressive behavior relates to various behavioral treatments. The research on phobias is illustrative.
Such treatments as relaxation training and systematic desensitization (through imagination) (Jacobson, 1929; Wolpe, 1958) were found to be more effective than verbal psychotherapy for simple phobics (e.g., Gelder & Marks, 1968) , but they proved relatively ineffective with severe agoraphobics (Marks, 1971) .
A central feature of what are probably the most successful behavioral treatments for agoraphobia is exposure in vivo, which involves rewarding the client for walking around in a fear-eliciting situation (e.g., mall or supermarket) (Foa, Jameson, Turner, & Payne, 1980; Mavissakalian & Barlow, 1981) . On these occasions, the client experiences strong somatic symptoms of fear. During the process, the therapist discusses the value of the procedure with each client.
Even with the use of exposure in vivo, the success rate for clients with agoraphobia is only 60-70%, and as many as 50% experience a relapse and require more treatment (Munby & Johnston, 1980) . Adding cognitive techniques, such as paradoxical intention and self-statement training, did not add any therapeutic benefit (Williams & Rappoport, 1983) . Nevertheless, many clients do show improvement when the technique of exposure in vivo is used.
No one knows precisely how exposure in vivo brings about a therapeutic effect. After an exhaustive review of the literature, Barlow (1988) concluded that a self-initiated program of practicing the exposure procedure was more effective than therapistmandated practice. This conclusion is consistent with the present model, which proposes emotion regulation through goaldirected, self-initiated, or self-managed expressive movements.
The current model suggests some new features that could be added to behavioral techniques such as exposure in vivo. Clients could be trained to recognize specific fear symptoms, particularly facial movements or tensions that signal fear, while they are still at a low level of intensity. They could be given training in relaxing these particular muscles and in contracting other muscles that are associated with emotions antagonistic to fear (e.g., joy and anger). These expressive techniques could be combined with emotion-eliciting imagery. It has been shown that quite strong effects on emotion experience can be obtained by means of self-induced imagery or imagination, and such imagery typically elicits covert involuntary or spontaneous expressive activity (Rusalovaetal., 1975; Schwartz etal., 1976) . Imagery with instructions that facilitate openness of expression, particularly when used in a therapy relationship, should generate even stronger effects on emotion experience. These therapy techniques suggested by the model should be guided by an approach that requires the therapist and client to identify the specific emotions involved and to deal with the associated somatic structures in the therapist's office and during the exposure procedure.
In summary, the best of behavioral techniques do not have high success rates with phobias. This may be due in part to a lack of understanding of the differential rates of development of the brain mechanisms underlying different types of learning involved in the acquisition of phobias. According to the theory of Jacobs and Nadel (1985) , the learning (locale) system that may prevent a frightening situation from giving rise to a phobia is nonfunctional in infancy and becomes dysfunctional under stress. The relatively low success rate may also be a function, in part, of the lack of a theoretically guided discrete emotions approach to the use of expressive behavior techniques suggested by the proposed model of emotion regulation. Techniques involving exposure in vivo do result in improvement for many phobic clients, and two reasons for their therapeutic effect seem consistent with the proposed model. First, exposure in vivo elicits emotion arousal and some forms of expressive behavior. Second, exposure is most effective when there is repeated self-initiated practice of the procedure.
The present model does not suggest that any therapy should rely solely on techniques that focus on facial expressions, but rather that such techniques be added to existing cognitive and behavioral techniques that have proved effective. It is also suggested that these techniques should be guided by differential emotions theory or a discrete emotions approach that emphasizes the organizing and motivational influences of each emotion. Given a balanced, theoretically guided approach to therapy, there is good reason to give facial expressions of emotions a more central place. A number of theorists agree that facial expressions are critical to the processes underlying differentiated, specific emotion experiences (Gellhorn, 1964; Izard, 1971; Leventhal, 1984; Tomkins, 1963) . Further, as already noted, facial expressions are readily observable, voluntary, and controllable, and they provide the most efficient route to emotion-specific feelings or subjective experiences, which, as everyone agrees, must be dealt with in therapy.
Summary of model and its implications.
In summary, the model proposes several ways that facial expressions influence emotion experiences. In early development expressions automatically activate, or contribute to the activation of, emotion feeling states and accompanying physiological processes via innate pathways. Through maturation and learning the individual modifies the innate connections and establishes new ones. The connections that emerge with development and learning provide other mechanisms whereby expressions can influence feelings. The individual can exercise self-management of spontaneous or event-elicited expressions by willfully inhibiting, attenuating, or amplifying them. One can encode voluntary expressions to activate a corresponding feeling state or to alter an ongoing feeling state. Therapist-manipulated emotion expressions (which are ultimately voluntary expressions) can be used to influence feeling states and accompanying physiological processes. However, the model recognizes that the most robust effects on emotion experience are obtained when self-managed expressive behaviors are congruent with the goal of the individual. The model suggests several factors that may explain why voluntary expressions, whether self-initiated or experimenter manipulated, have a weaker effect on emotion experiences than self-management of spontaneous or event-elicited expressions. Adding facial-expression techniques, guided by a discrete emotions theoretical framework, to proven behavioral and cognitive techniques should increase the effectiveness of emotion regulation in therapy.
Alternative Explanations of Activation and Regulation of Emotion Experiences Through Expressive Behavior
There are several possible mechanisms that might account for the role of expressive behavior and its neural substrates in the activation and regulation of emotion experience. Following Darwin, James, and Gellhorn, Tomkins (1962) and Izard (1971) proposed that sensory feedback from facial muscles and skin can be transformed to emotion experience or feeling state, without cognitive mediation. Laird (1974) has proposed that the effective mechanism is self-perception of facial expression. However, in a recent review of the expression-experience research, Adelmann and Zajonc (1988) concluded that the evidence has weakened the tenability of this position. They made a case for the effectiveness of expression-regulated venal blood flow in the brain (also see Zajonc, 1985; Zajonc et al., 1988) .
There is also the possibility of emotion activation even though the efferent (motor) message from subcortical centers to the face is blocked, preventing any movement in the expressive muscles. Such activation assumes either (a) a reafferent loop (the efferent message triggers emotion-specific sensory feedback) or (b) the efficacy of the efferent message to trigger the central processes required for emotion experience (Izard, 1977, pp. 55-64; cf. Leventhal, 1984; Tomkins, 1962) .
As Cacioppo et al. (1986) have noted, facial expressions are frequently paired with congruent feelings, This is especially so in early development, before learned regulatory techniques enable the dissociation of expression and feeling. It is possible that through numerous expression-feeling pairings, a particular expression achieves the status of a conditional stimulus (CS) for the corresponding feeling. Thus, an expression may influence feeling through its potency as a CS. This alternative explanation, insofar as it pertains to the effects of self-initiated expression, is not inconsistent with differential emotions theory or the present model of expression-feeling relations.
Finally, there is the possibility that through learning and experience, a person acquires a memory or motor image of the expressive behavior and learns to substitute the motor image for sensory feedback. Learned associations or connections between expression and feeling may make it possible to bypass motoric expression in the emotion activation process. Thus, learning and experience may make it possible for the individual to emit central images that elicit emotion without involving efferentafferent loops (Izard, 1977; Chap. 3; Tomkins, 1962, Chap. 9) .
Because of the variety of possible emotion-activation processes involving expressive behavior directly or indirectly, reports of emotion experience by spinal-cord-injured patients or curarized individuals do not negate the FFH. In addition to the operation of alternative emotion-activation processes in a curarized individual, there is the very high probability that no one of sound mind could avoid experiencing emotion at the very thought of being curarized-becoming totally dependent on machines and the skills of others to breathe, swallow, and survive. What the clinical reports of spinal-cord-injured patients and other recent neuroscience investigations have shown is that there is little or no evidence that feedback from organs innervated by the autonomic nervous system influences the quality of emotion experiences (Chwalisz et al., 1988; LeDoux, 1987; Reisenzein, 1983) .
Research on the FFH should be interpreted as testing the hypothesis that expressive behavior is one means of activating and regulating emotion experiences. There is no reason to believe that emotion experience is always dependent on, and signaled by, observable expressions. Expressive behavior may be more important in emotion activation and regulation than in sustaining emotion. Experience may outlast expression, with cognitive and hormonal factors playing a more important role in sustaining emotion experience.
There is little empirical evidence relating to any of the foregoing alternatives. Hypotheses relating to the activation of specific emotions through some of the mechanisms (e.g., the reafferent loop and cerebral blood flow) resist direct empirical validation. Nevertheless, the theoretical and practical implications of knowledge of the structures and processes in the activation and regulation of emotions should continue to motivate research in any feasible mode.
This article has focused on the role of facial expressions in emotion experiences or feelings. The arguments for the effectiveness of self-management of expressions in regulating emotion feelings do not imply that facial-expressive behavior is the only avenue to emotion activation or emotion regulation. Body posture and coping strategies have been shown to affect emotion experiences (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; Riskind, (984; Riskind & Gotay, 1982 ; also see Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982) . It is generally agreed that a variety of cognitive processes, and some evidence that precognitive processes (Zajonc, 1980) , activate and influence emotions. Imagery has repeatedly proved quite effective in inducing emotion experience, although such imagery typically induces overt or covert expressions as well as feelings (Fridlund & Izard, 1982; Rusalova et al., 1975; Schwartz, Ahem, & Brown, 1979) .
Conclusion
The weight of available evidence suggests that patterns of expressive behavior can be effectively used in the management of emotion experience. The most robust effects have been achieved through self-management of spontaneous or naturally occurring expressions, but at least a weak, nonspecific effect for experimenter-manipulated, voluntary expressions has been supported by a dozen or so studies.
Techniques of expressive-behavior control are undoubtedly widely used in the socialization practices of our culture and others. They are also used more or less informally in various forms of psychotherapy, and a few new therapeutic approaches are making explicit connections to current emotion theory and research, including the work on expressive behavior (Barlow, 1988; Safran & Greenberg, 1988) . Older approaches to psychotherapy that used expressive-behavior techniques probably relied on applications of folk wisdom such as that stemming from the likes of Homer, Shakespeare, Darwin, and James. There now are theoretical models and an empirical foundation for the formal development and systematic application and evaluation of expressive-behavior methods for the activation and regulation of emotion experiences. Such methods can be tailored for use by parents and teachers, and they can be combined with established behavioral and cognitive techniques for an integrated approach to therapy.
